2. The
Current Global Calculus of UMP 2、当前对非常规货币政策的全面分析
That brings me to my next main
point: where do we stand with UMP today?
这是我要说的第二点：目前非常规货币政策的情况如何？
Let me say it up front: I do not
suggest a rush to exit. UMP is still needed in all places it is being used,
albeit longer for some than for others. In Europe, for example, there is a good
deal more mileage to be gained from UMP. In Japan too, exit is very likely some
way off.
首先我想说，我不建议立刻退出。所有采取了非常规货币政策的领域依旧需要该政策，尽管有的需要更长时间，有的较短。例如，欧洲需要从非常规货币政策获得更多好处。对日本来说，退出也为时尚早。
The day will come when this
period of exceptionally loose monetary policy, both conventional and
unconventional, must end—in line with economic recovery and its impact on
inflation. We need to plan for that day, especially since we do not know
exactly when it comes.
随着经济复苏以及政策对通胀的影响，总有一天我们必须终止十分宽松的常规和非常规货币政策。我们需要为这一天做出规划，这尤其是因为我们并不知道具体时间。
One thing we can say for certain:
the path to exit will and should depend on the pace of recovery, the latter
mitigating the potential downsides of the former.
有一点能肯定：退出的路径将会，也必须，取决于复苏的速度。后者将减轻前者的潜在负面效应。
This calculus will not be easy,
however. Together, we need to keep an eye on both financial stability and
growth. Together, we need to watch whether the benefits of UMP are subject to
diminishing returns. Together, we need to analyze whether the financial side-effects
get worse over time.
但进行分析并不容易。我们需要共同留意金融稳定性和增长，共同关注非常规货币政策的效果是否越来越弱，还要共同分析金融副作用是否逐渐恶化。
Just as with entry, exit will
take us into uncharted territory. Yet I remain optimistic. Central banks
handled entry well, and we see no reason why they should not handle exit
equally well.
正如开始实施时一样，政策的退出也会将我们带入一个未知领域。但我依然保持乐观。央行在开始实施时做得很好，我们相信它们在退出时会同样出色。
So, the Fund and policymakers need
to start thinking about what exit will eventually look like. That includes the
implications for global economic and financial stability: the whole system, not
just one part of it. This is an issue that the Fund has been watching and will
continue to watch closely. It is, after all, the IMF’s raison d'être.
所以，基金组织和政策制定者需要开始思考政策退出后的情形，包括其对全球经济和金融稳定性的影响：这里指整个体系，而非体系的某一部分。基金组织一直关注并将继续密切关注这一方面。毕竟这是基金组织存在的目的。
For now, I would like to
highlight a few aspects of how we are thinking about these channels and
connections.
现在，我重点谈谈我们对这些渠道和联系的看法。
One, the balance of stability and
risk-taking.
第一，稳定和冒险行为的平衡。
The relationship between the two
is not straightforward. Certainly, long periods of very loose monetary policy
and ultra-low rates, mixed with the hunt for higher yields could prove to be a
recipe for unhealthy risk-taking. At the same time, the absence of UMP could
easily have resulted in worse growth outcomes, with even greater risk of
financial distress.
这两者的关系并不是一目了然的。长期非常宽松的货币政策和超低利率加上获取高收益的心态确实促使了不健康的冒险行为。但同时，非常规货币政策的缺失很容易导致更坏的经济增长局面，增加金融困顿风险。
As always, we will know much more
as time passes. In particular, we will know whether the global market
correction earlier this year was a useful reminder that exuberance can go too
far, or if it is the start of a new period of choppy conditions and regular
scares. We all hope for the former, but prudence suggests planning for the
latter possibility.
如同以往，随着时间推移我们将得到更多信息。具体说来，我们将知道今年年初的全球市场调整是预示上涨趋势可以持续，还是标志新一轮动荡和恐慌的开始。我们都希望是前者，但是谨慎的做法是为后一个可能做好准备。
Some modes of UMP affect the long
end of the yield curve, perhaps more so than conventional monetary policy. That
would tend to affect a broader range of assets and asset classes than we
typically see with conventional monetary policy, and thus creates a risk-taking
incentive that could prove worrying.
一些非常规货币政策模式会影响收益率曲线的长端，且程度可能比常规货币政策更甚。与常规货币政策的影响相比，它将对更大范围的资产和资产类别造成影响。这些让人们担心非常政策会刺激冒险行为。
Weighing these factors, our sense
is that today’s calculus of UMP benefits is still clearly positive for UMP
countries.
权衡这些因素，我们认为，就当前而言，实施非常规货币政策的国家仍然能因此收益。
Two, we need to look more closely
at the spillovers.
第二，我们需要仔细研究溢出效应。
Admittedly it is difficult to
disentangle the effects of UMP from other factors affecting economic outcomes.
Still, tightening cycles in the past have created concerns or spillovers, and
we should learn from history.
应当承认，很难将非常规货币政策的效应和其他影响经济结果的因素区分开。但是鉴于以往的收紧周期也引发了关注或溢出效应，我们应当从中吸取经验教训。
For now, advanced and emerging
countries have generally done a good job managing the policy implications from
UMP.
目前，发达国家和新兴国家在应对非常规货币政策带来的影响方面总体都做得很好。
We have been working on a series
of case studies: 13 of the largest non-UMP countries that collectively
represent about 40 percent of global output.
我们开展了一系列案例研究：对象是未实施非常规货币政策的大国，这13个国家占据了全球40%的产出。
Following the initiation of UMP,
we have seen episodes of asset price increases and rising capital flows—by one
measure, cumulative net flows to emerging markets rose by $1.1 trillion since
2008, squarely above its long-run structural trend by an estimated $470
billion. Corporate leverage and foreign exchange exposures also increased in
several cases. Real estate prices have been buoyant, for example, in Brazil,
Canada, China, Korea, and Thailand. Stock prices rebounded for a considerable
time in China, Mexico and Russia. And credit expanded rapidly in Brazil, China,
Korea and Turkey. In recent months, some of these developments have been partly
reversed.
启动非常规货币政策后，出现了资产价格上涨和资本流量增大——从数据看，向新兴市场的累积净流入自2008年起增长1.1万亿美元，较预测的长期结构性趋势足足多出4700亿美元。在好几个国家，企业杠杆率和外汇暴露也有所增加。一些国家如巴西、加拿大、中国、韩国和泰国的房地产价格高涨。中国、墨西哥和俄罗斯的股票价格反弹持续了很长一段时间。巴西、中国、韩国和土耳其的信贷迅速扩张。但最近几个月，以上情况有所逆转。
These positive trends, of course,
are what we would expect, even with conventional policy. Again, it is the
recipe of low interest rates and the hunt for return—investors search for other
opportunities, capital flows into emerging markets, with the usual potential for
appreciation and credit growth.
当然，这种有利趋势是我们可以预见的，即便实施常规政策也会如此。这是低利率措施的结果，也是资本追求回报的结果——投资者寻求其他机遇，资本流向新兴市场，通常带来升值潜力和信贷增长。
In general, countries have
undertaken sound macroeconomic management, with actions to make their financial
systems more secure—including macroprudential and capital flow management
measures.
总的来说，各国都实施了稳健的宏观经济管理措施，且采取的行动——包括宏观审慎措施和资本流动管理措施——让它们的金融系统更加安全。
The upshot of all this is that the
present calculus of UMP for non-UMP countries is, on balance, still positive.
At least for now.
以上结果显示，对未实施非常规货币政策的国家来说，非常规货币政策分析结果总体上看是有利的。至少目前如此。
We all know that the situation
can turn quickly—as we have seen in recent days in some emerging market
economies. These risks require constant monitoring and reassessment.
我们都知道情况可能瞬时逆转——如近日的一些新兴市场经济体出现的情况。需要对这些风险进行持续监控和重估。
Three, thinking more about the
taxonomy of exit will help better assess the balance of risks and spillovers.
第三，更深入地思考退出的各类途径，能更好地评估风险和溢出效应的平衡。
Let me ask a very basic question.
What do we mean by “exit” from UMP? The answer to this is not always clear. We
have seen many innovations. Yet the conventional and unconventional are often
lumped together. Monetary policies today are multi-faceted, involving “forward”
guidance about future policies, purchases of private assets to support
stability in specific markets, and less focused “quantitative easing” purchases
that aim to boost activity more generally.
我先问一个很基础的问题。什么是“退出”非常规货币政策？这个问题的答案有时并不明朗。我们见过很多新颖观点。但人们经常对常规和非常规一概而论。如今的货币政策包括多个方面，如对未来政策的“前瞻性”指导，购买私人资产以确保特定市场的稳定性，以及支持重点不明显的“量化宽松”购买，以期更广泛地促进经济活动。
In the long-term it is clear that
exit from UMP will involve phasing out, and ultimately reversing all of these
policies. That does not mean that they will all occur at the same time.
长期看来，退出非常规货币政策显然包括逐步取消并最终逆转所有这些政策。但并不意味着它们必须同时发生。
Indeed, it seems likely that some
of the more “conventional” aspects of UMP, such as guidance on the future path
of policy rates or the rate of future asset purchases, will be adjusted well
before any assets are sold. This means that exit from UMP is likely to be
slower and longer than is often portrayed, and feared.
非常规货币政策中偏“常规”的措施，如对政策利率的未来走势或未来资产购买比率的指引，可能需要在资产出售前的较长一段时期里就予以调整。这意味着退出非常规货币政策可能比人们通常印象里令人担心的速度更慢，费时更长。
It is also safe to assume that
exit will depend on progress on other policies and on the durability of the
recovery.
我还可以较为肯定地说，退出措施还将取决于其他政策的进展以及复苏的持久性。
In fact, for exit to be
understood and digested as smoothly as possible by the markets, it needs to be
contingent on the strengthening of the economy.
事实上，鉴于市场需要尽可能顺利地理解并消化，政策退出要依据经济发展情况而定。 |
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