朱民在德国央行/德国研究基金会/国际货币基金组织联合会议上的开幕辞（中英对照）

英文版：Housing Markets, Financial Stability and the Economy.doc

中文版：住房市场、金融稳定与经济.doc

Housing Markets, Financial Stability and the Economy

住房市场、金融稳定与经济

 

– Opening Remarks at the Bundesbank/German Research Foundation/IMF Conference

——在德国央行/德国研究基金会/国际货币基金组织联合会议上的开幕辞

 

Min Zhu, Deputy Managing Director, IMF

基金组织副总裁朱民

 

June 5, 2014

2014年6月5日

 

Let me begin by thanking the Bundesbank and the German Research Foundation for organizing this conference with us.

 

首先，我要对德国央行和德国研究基金会与我们共同组织这次会议表示感谢。

 

I will make three points in my remarks:

 

我的发言包括三个方面：

 

First, housing is an essential sector of the economy but also one that has been the source of vulnerabilities and crises. Hence, while the recent recovery in global housing markets is a welcome development, we need to guard against another unsustainable boom.

 

首先，房地产是经济的重要部门，但同时也一直是脆弱性和危机的根源。因此，虽然近期全球住房市场的复苏态势良好，但我们需要警惕新一轮不可持续的高涨。

 

Second, detecting over-valuation in housing markets is still more of an art than a science. Broad measures, such as house price to rent ratios, provide a first pass. But detailed analysis and judgment are needed to make a call about overvaluation.

 

第二，对住房市场估值过高的监测仍然更多的是一门艺术，而非科学。宽泛的衡量标准如房价/租金比是第一道关口。但要确定地指出存在估值过高，则需要进行详细分析和判断。

 

Third, the policy toolkit to manage housing booms is still under construction. A variety of tools have been used and the evidence suggests some short-run success. But more analysis and sharing of experience are needed on what works and what doesn’t. Conferences of this kind are useful in adding to our stock of knowledge.

 

第三，管理住房市场高涨的政策工具包仍在制定过程中。已经使用了很多工具，并有证据表明，取得了一些短期成功。但是，关于哪些工具是可行的，哪些是不可行的，需要进行更多分析并共享经验。今天这样的会议有助于增加我们的知识储备。

 

Role of the housing sector

住房市场的作用

 

Let me elaborate on these three points, beginning with the role of the housing sector. Food, clothing, shelter: these are traditionally thought of as basic needs of mankind; so the housing sector satisfies an essential need. Housing is also of course an important component of investment. And in many countries housing makes up the largest component of wealth. For instance, in the United States, real estate account for roughly a third of the total assets held by the nonfinancial private sector. The majority of households tend to hold wealth in the form of their homes rather than in financial assets: in France, for example, less than a quarter of households own stocks but nearly 60 percent are homeowners.

 

让我对这三点进行阐述。首先，关于住房市场的作用。食物、衣服和住所：这些一般被认为是人类的基本需求；因此，住房市场满足了人们的基本需要。当然，住房也是投资的重要组成部分。在许多国家，住房是财富的最大组成部分。例如，在美国，房地产约占非金融私人部门持有的总资产的三分之一。大多数家庭倾向于以住房形式持有财富，而不是金融资产：例如，在法国，只有不到四分之一的家庭持有股票，但是有近60%的家庭拥有住房。

 

Housing also plays other key roles; for instance, mortgage markets are important in the transmission of monetary policy. Adequate housing can also facilitate labor mobility within an economy and help economies adjust to adverse shocks. In short, a well-functioning housing sector is critical to the overall health of the economy. And as economies develop, we expect a corresponding deepening and growth of housing markets.

 

住房也发挥着其他关键作用；例如，抵押贷款市场在传导货币政策方面很重要。充足的住房也可以促进劳动力在经济体系内的流动，并有助于经济体在面对不利冲击时进行调整。总之，一个运作良好的住房部门对于经济的整体健康至关重要。随着经济的发展，住房市场也应相应地深化和增长。

 

Despite its importance, however, the housing sector has not received adequate attention from macroeconomists. As Ed Leamer once noted, leading textbooks in the field often did not have any mention of the housing sector. Of course, all that has changed since the Great Recession. The bursting of the real estate bubble in the United States was followed by the deepest global downturn since the Great Depression. It reminded people of the collateral damage that can be triggered by housing collapses.

 

然而，尽管其重要性，但住房部门并未得到宏观经济学家的足够重视。埃德·里默（Ed Leamer）曾指出，该学科领域的主要教材通常不会提及住房市场。当然，自大衰退以来，这一切都变了。美国房地产市场泡沫破灭之后，出现了自大萧条以来最严重的全球经济衰退。它提醒人们，住房市场崩溃可能引起附带损失。

 

Indeed, all through history, housing booms and busts have quite often been detrimental to both financial stability and the real economy. Many major episodes of banking distress have been associated with boom-bust cycles in property prices. IMF research shows that of the nearly 50 systemic banking crises in recent decades, more than two thirds were preceded by boom-bust patterns in house prices. The cost of resolving housing crises can be very high—in the case of Ireland, for instance, government bailouts of banks from the housing collapse ate up 40 percent of the country’s GDP. In contrast to housing cycles, boom-bust cycles in stock prices are much less likely to trigger systemic banking crises.

 

事实上，纵观历史，住房市场的繁荣与衰退往往不利于金融稳定和实体经济。几次主要的银行危机均与房地产价格的涨跌周期相关。基金组织的研究表明，在近几十年来的50次左右的系统性银行危机中，三分之二以上的危机在爆发之前，住房价格出现大涨大跌的情况。解决住房危机的成本可能很高，例如，爱尔兰政府在住房市场崩溃后对银行进行纾困的成本占该国GDP的40%。与住房周期不同，股票价格的涨跌周期不太可能引发系统性银行危机。

 

Even when housing busts do not have a large financial stability impact, they can affect the real economy. Research shows that recessions in OECD countries are more likely given a house price bust. Such recessions also tend to be much deeper and generate more unemployment than normal recessions. In short, there is abundant evidence that housing cycles can be a threat to financial and macroeconomic stability. Hence it is crucial to keep an eye on current housing market developments to keep them from going through another boom-bust cycle.

 

即使住房市场暴跌没有对金融稳定产生大的影响，它们也可能对实体经济产生影响。研究表明，经合组织国家在住房价格暴跌后更可能出现经济衰退。而这种经济衰退也往往更深刻，并且其导致的失业人数要多于通常衰退下的失业人数。简言之，有大量证据表明，住房市场可能会危及金融和宏观经济稳定。因此，必须密切关注当前住房市场的发展，防止其出现新一轮的暴涨暴跌周期。

 

Detecting overvaluation in housing markets

对住房市场估值过高情况的监测

 

So where do housing markets stand today? House prices and residential investment declined in many countries at the onset of the Great Recession. Since then, there has been a rebound. Overall, house prices are inching up again: the IMF’s Global House Price Index has increased for the last seven quarters in a row. Over the past year, 33 out of 51 countries in our index showed increases in house prices. In some cases house prices are recovering from a sharp correction during the Great Recession. In other cases, house prices have continued an upward march with only a bit of moderation during the Great Recession.

 

那么，目前的住房市场是什么情况呢？在大衰退开始时，许多国家的房价和住宅投资都有所下降。之后出现了反弹。总体而言，房价再一次上扬：基金组织的全球房价指数在过去七个季度里连续上升。在过去一年里，我们指数中所包含的52个国家中有33个出现了房价上涨。在某些国家，房价是从大衰退时期的大幅回调中恢复。但另有一些国家，其房价上行在大衰退期间只是稍有放缓，目前则继续上涨。

 

Have these developments moved house prices closer to or further away from economic fundamentals? One common first pass attempt to answer this question is by looking at long-run valuation ratios. Theory asserts that house prices, rents, and incomes should move in tandem over the long run. If house prices and rents get way out of line, people would switch between buying and renting, eventually bringing the two in alignment. Similarly, in the long run, the price of houses cannot stray too far from people’s ability to afford them––that is, from their income. The ratios of house prices to rents and incomes can thus provide an initial check on whether house prices are out of line with economic fundamentals.

 

这些发展态势使房价更接近还是更远离了经济的基本面？要回答这个问题，通常来说，第一轮测定是通过分析长期估值比率。理论认为，从长远来看，房价、租金和收入应当一起移动。如果房价和租金不一致，人们会在买房和租房之间相互转换，最终使两者相一致。同样，从长远来看，房屋的价格不可能过于偏离人们的购买力，即收入。因此，房价与租金和收入的比率可以初步检查房价是否偏离了经济基本面。

 

What does the evidence show? Among the OECD countries, these ratios remain well above the historical averages for a majority of countries. This is true for instance for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway and Sweden. This evidence provides a broad indication of housing market valuation. But one cannot assess overvaluation from this evidence alone. Whereas the long-run relationships do generally act as an anchor, house prices often drift away from them strongly and for long periods. Demand momentum leads to increases in house prices, particularly in situations where the supply of housing cannot be adjusted quickly due to geographical or other constraints. Judgments about housing valuation thus require supplementary information, such as credit growth, household indebtedness, lender characteristics, and the method of financing.

 

现实情况如何？大多数经合组织国家的这些比率仍然远高于历史平均水平。例如，澳大利亚、比利时、加拿大、挪威和瑞典即是如此。这个证据提供了住房市场估值的宽泛指标。但是我们不能仅从这一证据来评估估值过高。尽管长期关系通常确实可作为一个标准，但房价往往会长期且大幅偏离之。需求增势会导致房价上涨，特别是在住房供应因地域或其他限制而无法快速调整的情况下。因此，关于住房估值的判断需要参考其他信息，如信贷增长、家庭负债情况、贷出人特点以及融资方法。

 

Of all these potential indicators of the risk of a boom-bust cycle, IMF research suggests it is particularly important to monitor credit growth. We find that there is a distinguishing feature of real estate booms that go ‘bad’: this feature is the coincidence between the housing boom and the rapid increase in leverage and exposure of households and financial intermediaries. During the global financial crisis, nearly all the countries with “twin booms” in real estate and credit markets—21 out of 23 countries that we analyzed—ended up suffering from either a financial crisis or a severe drop in GDP growth relative to the country’s pre-crisis performance. In contrast, of the seven countries that experienced a real estate boom but not a credit boom, only two went through a systemic crisis and these countries, on average, had relatively mild recessions.

 

基金组织的研究表明，在所有这些暴涨暴跌周期风险的可用指标中，对信贷增长情况的监测尤其重要。我们发现，房地产繁荣变“坏”有一个显著特点：在房地产市场繁荣的同时，还出现了家庭和金融中介的杠杆率的骤升和风险暴露程度骤增。在全球金融危机期间，几乎所有经历房地产和信贷市场“双繁荣”的国家（我们分析的23个国家中的21个）最终都爆发了金融危机，或者GDP增长较该国在危机前的表现严重下降。相比之下，在经历了房地产繁荣但不是信贷繁荣的七个国家中，只有两个经历了系统性危机，且平均而言，这些国家的经济衰退相对温和。

 

IMF staff are thus increasingly paying attention to credit growth, along with several other country-specific features of the housing market. In recent months, IMF staff have provided detailed judgments about housing markets for Australia, Israel and Canada, which are all countries where the broad measures of valuation are high. We have also provided assessments for many emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America, where mortgage credit and house price growth remain strong, and house prices in metropolitan areas show signs of overheating. In some cases, this more detailed look suggests much more modest overvaluation than indicated by the house price to income and house price to rent ratios. One example of this is Belgium, where the IMF concluded that despite the high valuation ratios, risks of a sharp correction of real estate prices appear contained. These country-specific factors for housing cycles suggest that the policy response cannot be ‘one size fits all’.

 

因此，基金组织工作人员越来越关注信贷增长，以及其他几个国家特有的住房市场特点。近几个月以来，基金组织工作人员对澳大利亚、以色列和加拿大的住房市场进行了详细判断，这些国家的宽泛估值指标都很高。我们也对亚洲和拉丁美洲的许多新兴市场经济体进行了评估，那里的抵押贷款信贷增长和房屋价格上涨依然强劲，大城市的房价出现了过热迹象。在某些国家，这种更加详尽的分析显示出的估值过高程度要低于根据房价/收入比以及房价/租金比所表明的高估程度。这方面的一个例子是比利时，基金组织认为，尽管比利时的估值比率很高，但房地产价格大幅回调的风险似乎已得到控制。这些国家特定的住房周期因素也表明，不可能制定一个“放之四海而皆准”的政策回应方案。

 

Constructing a policy toolkit

制定政策工具包

 

With that, let me move to the third—and last—part of my remarks: the role of policies to contain housing booms. At the outset, let me note that this is part of a broader discussion of the appropriate role for monetary policy in the ‘new normal’. While many aspects of this role remain under active discussion, on thing is clear: monetary policy will have to be more concerned than it was before with financial stability and hence with housing markets. The era of ‘benign neglect’ of house price booms is over.

 

下面是我发言的第三个也是最后一个方面：政策在遏制房地产暴涨方面的作用。 首先，我要指出，这个问题也是关于货币政策在“新常态”中作用的更广泛讨论的组成部分。虽然该作用的许多方面仍然在积极讨论之中，但有一点是明确的，即货币政策将比以往更加关注金融稳定和住房市场。“善意忽视”房价暴涨的时代已经结束。

 

That said, regulation of the housing sector involves a complex set of policies. The noted economist Avinash Dixit suggested we use the acronyms “MiP, MaP, MoP” to remind ourselves of the set of policies. ‘MiP’ stands for microprudential policies, which of course aim to ensure the resilience of individual financial institutions. Such policies are necessary for a sound financial system but may not be sufficient. Sometimes, actions suitable at the level of individual institutions can destabilize the system as a whole. Hence we also need not just ‘MiP’ but ‘MaP’, that is, macroprudential policies aimed at increasing the resilience of the system as a whole.

 

即便如此，对住房部门的监管涉及一系列复杂的政策。著名经济学家阿维纳什·迪克西特（Avinash Dixit）建议我们使用“MiP, MaP, MoP”这些缩写来提醒我们这套政策。‘MiP’ 代表微观审慎政策，其目的自然是确保单个金融机构的应变能力。 这种政策对于健全的金融体系来说是必要的，但可能并不充分。有时候，在单个机构一级的适当行为可能会破坏整个系统。因此，我们不仅需要 ‘MiP’，也需要‘MaP’，即旨在提高整个系统抵御能力的宏观审慎政策。

 

The main macroprudential tools that have been used to contain housing booms are limits on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios and sectoral capital requirements. Limits on LTV ratios cap the size of a mortgage loan relative to the value of a property, in essence imposing a minimum down payment. Limits on DTI ratios restrict the size of a mortgage loan to a fixed multiple of household income. The hope is to thereby contain unaffordable increases in household debt. Such limits have long been in use in some economies. For example, Hong Kong SAR has operated an LTV cap since the early 1990s and introduced a DTI cap in 1994. In Korea, LTV limits were introduced in 2002 and DTI limits in 2005. During and after the global financial crisis, over 20 advanced and emerging economies all over the globe have followed the example of Hong Kong SAR and Korea.

 

用于遏制房价暴涨的主要宏观审慎工具是贷款/价值比（LTV）限制和贷款/收入比 （DTI）限制以及部门性资本要求。限制贷款/价值比可控制抵押贷款占房产价值的比例上限，这本质上是设定了最低首付。控制贷款/收入比的上限则可将抵押贷款规模限制在家庭收入的固定倍数。其目的在于遏制家庭债务增加到令人难以承受的程度。一些经济体一直使用这种限制。例如，香港特别行政区自20世纪90年代初以来一直实施贷款/价值比上限，并于1994年推出了贷款/收入比上限。在韩国，分别于2002年和2005年引入贷款/价值比和贷款/收入比。在全球金融危机期间和之后，全球各地有20多个先进和新兴经济体效法了香港特别行政区和韩国的做法。

 

Evidence thus far suggests that these measures are somewhat effective in cooling off both house prices and credit growth in the short run. They are able to break the financial accelerator mechanism that otherwise leads to a positive two-way feedback between credit booms and housing booms. But more fine tuning of these measures is needed. Macroprudential measures need to take into account the ability of market participants to circumvent some of the limits on leverage. In some countries, such as in Canada, LTV limits usefully distinguish between owner-occupied vs. investor mortgages.

 

迄今为止的证据表明，这些指标在短期内对于控制房价和信贷增长有一些效果。它们能够打破金融加速器机制——该机制会在信贷繁荣和房地产繁荣之间形成正双向反馈。但是，需要对这些指标进行更多的微调。宏观审慎措施需要考虑到市场参与者规避一些杠杆限制的能力。在一些国家，如加拿大，业主自用房和投资购房的抵押贷款的贷款/价值比限制得到了明确区分。

 

Another macroprudential tool is to impose stricter capital requirements on loans to a specific sector such as real estate. This forces banks to hold more capital against these loans, discouraging heavy exposure to the sector. In many advanced economies such as Ireland and Norway, capital adequacy risk weights were increased on mortgage loans with high LTV ratios. Sectoral capital requirements have also been used in a number of emerging markets such as Estonia, Peru, and Thailand. Evidence suggests that while this tool increases resilience from additional buffers, its ability to curb credit growth is mixed. Some IMF work suggests that higher capital requirements on particular groups of mortgage loans have some success in curbing house price growth in countries like Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, and Ukraine.

 

另外一个宏观审慎工具是对房地产等特定部门设定更加严格的资本金要求。这会迫使银行为这些贷款持有更多资本金，从而防止其过于暴露于该部门的风险。在许多先进经济体，如爱尔兰和挪威，贷款/价值比率较高的抵押贷款的资本充足率风险权重有所增加。一些新兴市场如爱沙尼亚、秘鲁和泰国也采用了部门性资本要求。有证据表明，虽然这个工具通过充实额外缓冲增强了抵御能力，但其遏制信贷增长的能力参差不齐。 基金组织的一些研究表明，对特定的抵押贷款类别设定较高的资本要求在遏制一些国家的房价增长方面取得了一些成功，这些国家包括保加利亚、克罗地亚、爱沙尼亚和乌克兰。

 

There are a number of reasons why higher capital requirements may be less effective in containing credit growth. First, when banks hold capital well above the regulatory minimum, lenders may not need to make any change in response to increases in risk weights. This often happens during housing booms when policymakers hope the tool to be most effective. Second, when lenders compete intensely for market share, they may internalize the costs of higher capital requirements rather than impose higher lending rates.

 

更高的资本要求在遏制信贷增长方面可能不太有效，有几个原因。首先，如果银行持有的资本远远高于最低监管要求，贷出人可能不需要做出任何变化来应对风险权重的增加。这通常发生在决策者希望该工具最有效的房地产繁荣期间。其次，当贷出人激烈争夺市场份额时，他们可能会将较高资本要求的成本内部化，而不是提高贷款利率。

 

Macroprudential tools may also not be effective to target housing booms that are driven by the shortage of housing or by increased housing demand from foreign cash inflows that bypass domestic credit intermediation. In such cases, other tools are needed. For instance, stamp duty has been imposed to cool down rising house prices in Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. Evidence shows that this fiscal tool did reduce demand from foreigners who were outside of the LTV and DTI regulatory perimeters. In other instances, high house prices could reflect supply bottlenecks, and hence the effectiveness of demand-focused instruments may be limited. In such cases, the mismatches should be fundamentally addressed by measures to increase the supply of housing.

 

宏观审慎工具可能也无法有效解决一切房价暴涨情况，比如由于住房短缺或者国外现金流入绕过国内信贷中介而推升住房需求所导致的房价暴涨。在这种情况下，需要采用其他工具。例如，香港特别行政区和新加坡通过征收印花税来为不断上涨的房价降温。有证据表明，这个财政工具的确减少了不受贷款/价值比和贷款/收入比监管的外国人的需求。在其他国家，高房价可能反映了供应瓶颈，因此，需求工具的效用可能是有限的。在这种情况下，应通过增加住房供应的措施从根本上解决供需错配问题。

 

Along with micro and macroprudential policies, we need ‘MoP’: monetary policy. It is often said using policy interest rates is a blunt tool for containing house price booms. But as I noted earlier, housing booms have often coincided with a generalized private credit boom. This suggests that monetary policy could be an important tool in many cases in support of macroprudential policies. It is true, however, that in many relevant cases at the moment, policy interest rates have to remain low to support economic recovery.

 

除了微观和宏观审慎政策，我们需要‘MoP’：货币政策。人们常说，政策利率是遏制房价暴涨的笨拙工具。但正如我在前面提到的，房价暴涨往往适逢私人信贷的普遍上涨。这表明，在许多情况下，货币政策可成为支持宏观审慎政策的一个重要工具。然而，在当前的许多国家，政策利率需要维持在低位，以支持经济复苏。

 

Conclusion

结论

 

Let me conclude. Housing booms have different characteristics across countries and time periods. What is common is that when the bust comes, it very often damages financial stability and the real economy. The tools for containing housing booms are still being developed. The evidence on their effectiveness is only just starting to accumulate. The interactions of various policy tools can be complex. But all this should not be an excuse for inaction. The interlocking use of multiple tools might overcome the shortcomings of any single policy tool. We need to move from “benign neglect” to an “all of the above” approach when it comes to policy choices.

 

让我总结一下。不同国家和不同时期的房地产繁荣具有不同的特点。但共同的一点是，当暴跌到来时，它往往会损害金融稳定和实体经济。遏制房价暴涨的工具仍在制定之中。关于其有效性的证据才刚刚开始积累。各种政策工具之间的相互作用可能十分复杂。但是所有这些都不应成为不作为的借口。对多种工具的联合使用或能克服单一政策工具的不足。当谈到政策选择时，我们需要从“善意忽视”转到“多多益善”。

 

It is only by maintaining an open dialogue on these issues that we will gain a solid understanding of how policies can contain housing booms. International coordination is also essential, since housing booms in one country can be fed by credit market developments abroad. The IMF intends to do its part. As I mentioned, assessments of housing markets are becoming a regular feature of our country reports. We also report on housing markets through our flagship publications, the World Economic Outlook and the Global Financial Stability Report, as well as through other reports to our Executive Board. We are working with other agencies to improve housing statistics. Next week, we are launching a new webpage where all this work will be given a home. I encourage you to visit the new Global House Watch page on imf.org over the coming weeks and see what we have to offer and to tell us how to do better.

 

 

只有通过继续就这些问题进行开诚布公的对话，我们才可以深刻认识到政策如何才能遏制房价暴涨。国际协调也必不可少，因为一国的房价暴涨可由国外信贷市场发展所推动。基金组织打算开展力所能及的工作。正如我所说的，评估住房市场正在成为基金组织国别报告的常见内容。我们也通过我们的旗舰出版物《世界经济展望》和《全球金融稳定报告》以及其他向执行董事会的报告来分析住房市场。我们正与其他机构合作，以改善住房统计数据。下周，我们将推出一个新的网页，专门介绍所有这些工作。我希望大家能在未来几周里访问imf.org网站上的“全球住房观察”这个网页，看看我们的工作，并告诉我们如何改进的建议。

 

The IMF is also contributing to the sharing of cross-country experiences through regular consultations with policymakers and experts. We held a successful conference last November, co-organized with the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, on housing issues. And I have no doubt that this conference will be just as successful. Thank you.

 

基金组织也在通过与决策者和专家的定期磋商来促进跨国经验的共享。去年11月，我们与达拉斯联邦储备银行成功举行了一次关于住房问题的会议。毫无疑问，本次会议也将一样成功。谢谢。